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THE PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION'S
CORPORATE TAX STATUS
I. INTRODUCTION
Under state domestic corporation law professional associations
have traditionally been ineligible for corporate status.' Under-
lying this position is the idea that the personal relationship
between the professional and his client is such that it precludes
having an impersonal corporate structure thrust between the
parties.2 As a result the professional has been denied many of
the tax benefits available to corporations, corporate employees,
and corporate stockholders. Professionals, however, have sought,
and obtained in many cases, corporate status under federal tax
law. The purpose of this note is to review the case law, regula-
tions, and statutes that developed out of the efforts by profes-
sionals to obtain corporate tax status and to discuss generally
the advantages and disadvantages of the professional corpora-
tion.
II. BACKIROUiND
A. The Significance of Morrissey
The case of Morrissey v. Commissioner3 dealt with the tax
status of a trust created to manage property for a profit. The
trust was not formally incorporated and had not, therefore, con-
formed to the requirements for establishing a corporation under
the appropriate state statutes. The Court, however, agreed with
the Interval Revenue Service that the definition of a corporation
in the Internal Revenue Code4 was broad enough to include
organizations that resembled corporations and that the trust in
question sufficiently resembled a corporation to be taxed as
such. The Court set forth the following criteria to be used as
standards in applying the resemblance test: limited liability,
free transferability of interest, centralized management, and con-
tinuity of life.5
The significance of the Morrissey decision lies in the Court's
reliance on federal tax law rather than state corporate law to
1. 18 Am. Jun. 2d Corporations § 31 (1963).
2. 7 Am. JuR. 2d Attorneys at Law § 85 (1963).
3. 296 U.S. 244 (1935).
4. INT. REV. CeDE of 1954, § 7701 (a) (3).
5. Besides the Morrissey standards the professional corporation must meet
the "business purpose" doctrine of Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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determine whether the trust should be treated as a corporation
for tax purposes. Although the professional association could
not qualify under state corporate law, it could comply with the
resemblance test laid down in Mo*rissey.
B. The Professiona vs. The InternaZ Revenue Service: The
Early Cases
In the early cases involving the corporate tax status of pro-
fessional associations, the Commissioner took the position that
professional associations that resembled corporations should not
be allowed to escape income tax at the corporate level. The In-
ternal Revenue Service argued in Pelton v. CommissionerO that
a medical clinic organized in the form of a trust with the pro-
fessionals occupying the position of shareholders sufficiently
met the Morrissey criteria to be taxed as a corporation. The
circuit court agreed and held that the clinic resembled a cor-
poration to the extent that it should be taxed as such. The court
noted that a professional practice could not be organized as a
corporation under Illinois law, the state in which the clinic was
located. But, the court said, federal standards and not state
standards are applicable when ascertaining whether or not an
organization is a corporation for federal income tax purposes.
The commissioner, however, changed his position in the later
cases when professional associations sought to obtain the tax
advantages of corporate status. In 1954 the Internal Revenue
Service contended in United States v. Kintner7 that an associa-
tion of doctors could not be a corporation for federal tax pur-
poses. The court, however, rejected the new position and held
that for federal tax purposes an association of doctors could have
corporate status if it met the criteria established by Morissey.
The association considered in Kintner met these criteria. Citing
Pelton as authority, the court reiterated that federal law, and
not state law, is the applicable standard by which to judge
whether or not an association is a corporation.
In Gait v. United States8 the Internal Revenue Service again
asserted its new theory and was again unsuccessful. The Galt
court was apparently unaware of the Morrissey, Pelton and
Kintner cases but rather relied on "the elementary principles of
justice" in reaching its conclusion. The Internal Revenue Serv-
6. 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
7. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
8. 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Texas 1959).
[Vol. 2
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ice failed to convince the court that these "elementary princi-
ples" were favorable towards its position. Instead, the court said
that the federal statutory definition of corporation was broad
enough to include doctors' associations such as the one it had
under consideration. Although the state law forbad an organ-
ization of doctors to incorporate, the court said that federal law
was the deciding factor as to the tax status of an organization.
The Internal Revenue Service was again unsuccessful in Fore-
man v. United States.9 The Foreman court noted and followed
all of the previous decisions on the issue and, as the Kintner
court, applied the criteria of Morrissey in ascertaining that the
association was taxable as a corporation. The court also cited
Galt as having reached a similar conclusion.
The Kintner Court had evaded the Commissioner's argument
that it was impossible for the doctor's association to meet the
limited liability criterion of Morissey. The state laws applicable
to the association did not permit any form of limited liability.
The Foreman court, however, made no attempt to avoid this
argument, but rather conceded that limited liability under state
law was impossible and decided that the association satisfac-
torily met the federal standards for corporate status despite its
inability to meet this particular criterion. The court apparently
reasoned that the association would have had limited liability
except for the express prohibition by state law and that state law
could not bar an association from gaining federal corporate tax
status. Thus if, because of state law, an association fails to meet
a Morrissey criterion, that alone is not sufficient to prohibit the
association from obtaining corporate status for federal purposes.
III. T~m KnuFrNi REauLA&noNs
In an effort to accomplish what it had failed to accomplish by
litigation, the Internal Revenue Service promulgated the Kint-
ner regulations1 ° that were a strict construction of the Morrissey
criteria. The regulations set forth the four forrissey criteria as
necessary elements for federal corporate status and also estab-
lished certain guidelines for each of these criteria. These guide-
lines made corporate status for professional organizations an
impossibility.
Section 7701(a) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
defines a corporation to include "associations, joint-stock com-
9. 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
10. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1-2 (1961).
1970] NoTs
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panies and insurance companies."' The Kintner regulations
explicitly define association as an organization which possesses
the characteristics set forth in MHorrisey.1 ]Moreover, the regu-
lations distinguish an "association" from a partnership or a
trust.1 3 The regulations also provide that if certain of the char-
acteristics are common to both a corporation and another
organizational form (e.g., a trust or partnership) these common
characteristics are not material in ascertaining whether the
organization being considered meets the resemblance test.14 They
give as an example:
[S]ince centralization of management, continuity of life,
free transferability of interests, and limited liability are
generally common to trusts and corporations, the deter-
mination of whether a trust which has such character-
istics is to be treated for tax purposes as a trust or as an
association depends on whether there are associates and
an objective to carry on business and divide the gains
therefrom.'
This provision, of course, completely eliminates the MHo~rsey
criteria from consideration in deciding whether an organization
is a corporation or trust. Ironically, the decision that was
reached in Morrissey was based on this exact factual situation.
That is, the question in Mornissey was whether the organization
in question was a trust or an association.
The regulations expressly preclude any partnership subject to
the Uniform Partnership Act from possessing the characteristic
of centralized management.' "[Biecause of the mutual agency
relationship between members of a general partnership...
[siuch a general partnership cannot achieve effective concentra-
tion of management powers and, therefore, centralized manage-
ment.'1 7 Moreover the regulations provide that a partnership
subject to the Uniform Partnership Act is incapable of possess-
ing the characteristic of limited liability,' since it can not limit
its liability under local law. These provisions have had the
11. INT. REv. CoD of 1954 § 7701(a) (3).
12. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a) (1961).
13. Id.
14. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (2) (1961).
15. Id. The criteria determined by the regulations to be applicable in this
case come from the "business purpose" doctrine of Gregory v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 465 (1935).
16. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (4) (1961).
17. Id.
18. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (1961).
(Vol. 22
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NOTES
greatest impact on professional partnerships. Since at the time of
the adoption of the regulations all professional partnerships
were subject to the Uniform Partnership Act, it was impossible
for such partnerships to obtain corporate status for tax purposes.
IV. Tm PormssioAL AssociATIox
The adoption of the Kintner regulations brought forth a fury
of protest from professional circles. The professionals, however,
sought and obtained relief from the state legislatures in the form
of the Professional Association Acts.19 These acts exempt pro-
fessional associations, formed in accordance with the statutes,
from the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act and, there-
fore, essentially remove the professional associations from the
provisions of the Kintner regulations applicable to partnerships
subject to the Uniform Partnership Act.
The professional association acts of the various states are
nearly uniform.20 In all cases the professional association act is
the applicable law governing the professionals that have gained
professional association status and the laws applicable to partner-
ships and private practitioners have no effect on the professional
association. 2
1
These acts establish a new form of limited liability for quali-
fying professionals. Although the association is liable for any
acts of its agents, the members of the association are not liable
individually. There is one exception to this general rule, how-
ever, that makes the rule unique. The member of the association
who actually performs the act that created the liability incurs
individual liability for that act along with the association. 22
This provision answers the criticism that any corporate form of
professional practice hampers the personal relationship that
should exist between the professional and his client.
These acts also permit the professional association to employ
an organizational structure practically identical to that of a
domestic corporation.2 3 The professional association is permitted
19. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 621.01 et seq. (Supp. 1969); GEORGIA CODE
ANN. § 84-4301 et seq. (Supp. 1968) ; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 274.005 (1969) ;
OHIO CoDE ANN. § 1785.01-.06 (1964); S. C. CODE ANN. § 56-1601 et seq.
(Supp. 1968).
20. Id. In the material that follows reference will be made only to the South
Carolina Professional Association Act since it may be of greatest interest, and
is essentially the same as the other acts.
21. E.g., S. C. CODE ANN. § 56-1616 (Supp. 1968).
22. Id. § 56-1607.
23. Id. § 56-1608.
1970]
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to continue as an entity despite the actions, death, or physical
or mental infirmity of a member.24 Moreover, these statutes per-
mit the free transferability of a member's interest in the associa-
tion provided that the transfer is made to another professional
authorized to render the same type of professional service that
is rendered by the association.2 5 These acts further provide that
all laws applicable to domestic corporations are also applicable
to professional associations unless they are in conflict with the
provision of the Professional Association Act.26
Generally speaking, the professional association statutes fall
into three groups depending on the status given to professional
associations. The more liberal statutes provide that professional
associations are corporations. 27 The more conservative statutes
provide that professional associations are unincorporated organi-
zations28 but specify that they are not partnerships.29 The third
group of statutes is somewhere between the two extremes. These
statutes designate the organizations as professional associa-
tions by name but specifically allow them to obtain corporate
status. o
V. RMULATION H
"Regulation H,"'1 an amendment to the Kintne regulations
issued by the Internal Revenue Service in 1965, was an obvious
attempt to circumvent the state professional association acts.
The amendment, which is entitled "Classification of professional
service organizations," provides that a professional organization
must not only meet the standards set forth by section (a) of the
Kintner regulations but it also must meet further requirements
established thereunder.8 2 "Regulation H" applies to all profes-
sional organizations regardless of the label placed on them by
state law, 8 deprives a professional organization of corporate
status for tax purposes if the organization does not possess the
usual characteristics "found in a business corporation,134 and
specifies certain characteristics as the usual characteristics of a
business corporation.
24. Id. § 56-1609.
25. Id. § 56-1614.
26. Id. § 56-1617.
27. See, e.g., F"A. STAT. ANN. § 612.03(2) (Supp. 1969).
28. E.g., S. C. CODF AxN. § 56-1602(b) (Supp. 1968).
29. Id. § 56-1603.
30. E.g., OHIO CODE ANwN. § 1785.02 (1964).
31. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1969).
32. Id. § 301.7701-2(h) (1) (i).
33. Id.
34. Id.
(Vol. 22
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The relationship between the professional and his customer,
client, or patient is the first characteristic. If this relationship
differs from the relationship commonly found between the or-
dinary business corporation and its clientele, the organization
cannot be treated as a corporation. In addition, the relationship
between the association members and the public must be the
same as the relationship between ordinary business associates
and the public.85
The second characteristic is a variation of the continuity of
life criteria found in Morrissey. The regulation provides that a
professional organization lacks continuity of life if a member's
right to receive his share of the profits is conditioned upon his
continued employment. Further, if a member must sell his share
of the organization when his employment terminates, then con-
tinuity of life does not exist if, in such a case, the remaining
members must agree to purchase his share or employ his suc-
cessor.
The third characteristic is centralization of management. The
regulation sets out specific powers that the management of a
professional organization must have (e.g. the power to hire and
fire all employees of the association, the power to establish condi-
tions of employment and the power to determine which profes-
sional will handle each individual case). The regulation further
provides that in a professional organization there is no centrali-
zation of management if a "member [of the professional organi-
zation] ... retains traditional professional responsibility."30
The fourth characteristic is limited liability. The regulation
provides that the liability of a member of a professional organi-
zation must not be any greater than the liability imposed on a
"shareholder-employee" of an ordinary business corporation. If
the members are subject to a greater liability, the professional
organization does not qualify.
3 7
The fifth characteristic is free transferability of interest. If
a member of the organization must have the consent of the other
members before he can transfer either his right to a share of the
profits or his right of employment, there is no free transfer-
ability of interest. Moreover, if a member must first offer to sell
his interest in the profits to the other members before selling to
an outsider, there is no free transferability of interest.38
35. Id. § 301.7701-2(b) (1) (ii).
36. Id. § 301.7701-2(h) (3).
37. Id. § 301.7701-2(h)(4).
38. Id. § 301.7701-2(h) (5) (i)-(ii).
1970] NOTES
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Since the professional association acts provide that the rela-
tionship between the professional and his client is to remain
unchanged, 93 professional associations could not meet the first
requirement of "Regulation H." The limited liability standard
of the regulation could not be met because, under the statutes, a
member is personally liable for his acts that result in liability
for the association.
40
The standards of continuity of life and centralization of man-
agement would also be difficult to meet. The regulation specifi-
cally states that the organization does not have centralized
management if the professional "retains traditional professional
responsibility." Since the professional must still live up to the
established standards of professional responsibility, it would be
most difficult for a professional organization to achieve central-
ized management.41 Although the continuity of life criteria
could possibly be met under the statutes, articles of association
or by-laws could possibly prevent the organization from meeting
this standard. At any rate, since a member's interest can only be
sold to another member of his profession,42 employment with
the organization and the rights to profits go hand in hand. A
professional must sell his interest in the organization if he has
been disqualified from rendering the service performed by the
organization.43 "Regulation H" indicates that the standard of
continuity of life could not be complied with if the right to
profits is contingent on the members' capacity to be employed.
The free transferability of interest requirement as set forth in
"Regulation H" does not present the obstacle that the other
"Regulation H" standards present. The professional association
acts do not impose any restrictions on the transfer of interest
"except as may be lawfully restricted in the Articles of Associa-
tion.144 The only problem that confronts the professional organi-
zation in regard to this standard, therefore, is the inability of
the organization to require that a member must first afford the
other members of the organization the opportunity to purchase
his interest before he can sell to an outsider. If it does, "Regula-
tion H" states that there is no free transferability of interests.
39. E.g., S. C. CODE ANN. § 56-1607 (Supp. 1968).
40. Id.
41. This statement is broad and includes the standards required by medical
associations and bar associations.
42. E.g., S. C. CODE ANN. § 56-1614 (Supp. 1968).
43. Id. § 56-1611.
44. Id. § 56-1610.
[Vol. 2
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VI. THE ArrmATH or REGULATiON H
To date no court, which has considered the validity of "Regu-
lation H," has upheld the regulation. The courts have used two
theories as a basis for their decisions. One theory is that the
Internal Revenue Service has exceeded its delegated authority in
issuing "Regulation H" and has in effect attempted to legislate
a change in the statutory definitions of "corporation"' and "part-
nership".45 The other theory is that "Regulation H" is arbitrary
and discriminates against professional corporations.46 Of the
three circuits that have decided the question, the Sixth and the
Tenth Circuits have followed the legislation theory41 and the
Fifth Circuit has followed the discrimination theory.48 Two dis-
trict courts have used both theories,49 and one court held that
the regulation was invalid without giving any specific grounds."
If and when the Supreme Court decides the question, the theory
it chooses may be significant. If the legislation theory is fol-
lowed, "Regulation H" may still be applicable to professional
associations that cannot obtain corporate status under state law.
The essence of the legislation theory is that "Regulation H" is
contrary to the statutory definition of a corporation promul-
gated by Congress. Section 7701 (a) (2) of the 1954 code defines
partnership as "a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other
unincorporated organization . . .which is not, with in the mean-
ing of this title, . . . a corporation . ,1 The term corpora-
tion is defined by section 7701(b) (3) to include "associations,
joint-stock companies, and insurance companies." 52  Section
7701 (a) (4) provides that the "term 'domestic' when applied to a
corporation ... means created or organized in the United
States or under the law of the United States or any state or
45. O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Empey, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969) ; Williams v. United States, 300 F. Supp.
928 (D. Minn. 1969); Cochran v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Ariz.
1969) ; Holder v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Kerzner
v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
46. Kerzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969); Williams v.
United States, 300 F. Supp. 928 (D. Minn. 1969); O'Neill v. United States,
281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
47. O'Neill v. United States, 410 F2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Empey, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969).
48. Kerzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969).
49. Williams v. United States, 300 F.Supp. 928 (D. Minn. 1969); Kerzner
v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
50. Wallace v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1968). The
court merely stated that it was following all of the other decisions that had
found the regulation invalid.
51. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7701 (a) (2).
52. Id. § 7701(a) (3).
1970] NOTES
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territory."5 3 These three sections when read together suggest that
a corporation organized under state law is a corporation under the
Internal Revenue Code and the courts have specifically held that
a state corporation is a corporation for federal tax purposes.
Thus "Regulation H" in so far as it applies to professional cor-
porations (i.e., professional service organizations given the status
of a domestic corporation by state law) is inconsistent with the
statutory definition of a corporation. But is it valid to the extent
that it applies to professional associations (i.e., professional
service organizations that are designated as professional associa-
tions by state law and declared to be unincorporated associations
but not partnerships) ? Although "Regulation H", to the extent
that it applies to professional associations, is not clearly incon-
sistent with the bare statutory definition of a corporation, it is
inconsistent with that definition as interpreted by the Court in
Morssey.
Under Morrissey an unincorporated organization can qualify
as a corporation for tax purposes if it sufficiently resembles a
corporation. If the organization meets the resemblance test laid
down in Morissey and refined by the Kintner regulations, it is
characterized as an association and thus it qualifies as a corpora-
tion. It could be argued that in applying "Regulation H" to pro-
fessional associations, the Internal Revenue Service is not legis-
lating a new definition of the term corporation but merely
exercising its authority to establish guidelines and explain pro-
visions of the Internal Revenue Code. 54 If, however, "Regulation
H" is held to be discriminatory, then it would be invalid to both
incorporated and unincorporated professional organizations,
because it imposes higher standards for obtaining corporate tax
status on unincorporated professional organizations than on
other unincorporated organizations such as trusts. The courts
that have used the discrimination theory have not adequately
explained its legal foundation. It is unclear whether the theory
is a constitutional one (i.e., that "Regulation H" is arbitrary and
discriminates against professional corporations in violation of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment) or whether the
theory is based on principles of administrative law. If the dis-
crimination theory is based on administrative law, theoretically
53. Id. § 7701(a) (4).
54. See, e.g. Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948),
rehearing denied, 334 U.S. 813 (1948); Halpin v. Collis Co., 243 F.2d 698
(8th Cir. 1951) ; Gunn v. Dallman, 171 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 937 (1949).
[VTol. 22
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the legislative and discrimination theories are one in the same.
That is to say, that both theories are based on the same iden-
that the Internal Revenue Service has overstepped its authority
by issuing regulations not warranted by the language of the
code. The particular rationale a court uses may be significant,
however. If the discrimination rationale is used, "Regulation H"
will be invalid as to both professional corporations and profes-
sional associations. But if the legislative rationale is used, "Regu-
lation H" will be invalid as to professional corporations but
valid as to professional associations.
Holder v. United States55 is the only case holding "Regulation
H" invalid to the extent that it applies to a professional associa-
tion. Holder involved a medical clinic formed as a professional
association under the Georgia Professional Association Act.
Georgia, like South Carolina, merely distinguishes a professional
association from a partnership without affording it corporate
status. The court implied that since the Georgia professional
associations are unincorporated under state law, they must
measure up to the resemblance standards of Morrissey and the
Kintner regulations. The court carefully analyzed each of the
Morrissey criteria and specifically pointed out how the Georgia
association met each one. The court also concluded that the asso-
ciation in question had fulfilled all of the necessary requirements
set forth by the Kintner regulations. The court, however, also
seemed to imply that all professional organizations, regardless of
the state law under which they are formed, must meet the
resemblance standard. This position, of course, is questionable
since most states have given the professional full corporate
status, and, as previously mentioned, once an organization has
corporate status under state law, by definition, it has corporate
status for federal tax purposes. The court cited with approval
the cases of United States v. Empey58 and O'Neil 'v. United
States,57 however, both of these cases involved professional cor-
porations 5s and in O'Neil the court said that it was not necessary
that a professional corporation meet the resemblance standards
of Morrissey and the Kintner regulations. The Holder court
concluded that "Regulation H" was "inconsistent with the judici-
55. 289 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
56. 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969).
57. 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969).
58. O'Neil dealt with the Ohio Professional Association Act which gives
associations full corporate status although designating them merely as associa-
tions. The association in Empey was one of lawyers given the power to incor-
porate under the corporation laws of Colorado by the Supreme Court of Colorado.
1970] NoTs
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ary-determined meaning of the [statutory definitions of cor-
poration and partnership]."59
The decision of Akola v. United State86° is enlightening as to
the validity of "Regulation H" as it applies to unincorporated
professional associations. The Ahola case dealt with a medical
clinic formed under the "business trust" provision of the Minne-
sota statutes.01 The court determined that the trust sufficiently
resembled a corporation to be taxed as such and held that the
provisions of "Regulation H" were invalid "because they are
inconsistent with all relevant judicial decisions rendered prior
to their promulgation, they conflict with the Treasury's prior
regulations, and they deliberately discriminate against profes-
sional associations formed by doctors or lawyers."62 These rea-
sons appear to be the soundest argument for "Regulation H's"
invalidity as far as unincorporated associations are concerned.
The Ahol opinion was not based on any inconsistency between
the Code and "Regulation H."
The question of the validity of "Regulation H" may never be
decided by the Supreme Court, for the Internal Revenue Service
may have given up the struggle. On August 8, 1969, the Internal
Revenue Service announced in TIE No. 1019 that "organiza-
tions of doctors, lawyers, and other professional people organ-
ized under state professional association acts will, generally, be
treated as corporations for tax purposes." 63 The opinion was
qualified, however, and it is unclear whether the Internal Rev-
enue Service will concede corporate tax status to an unincor-
porated professional association.
VII. THE TAx CoNsEQuBNczs os TEX
PRoissIoTAL ASSOcIATION AND CORPoRATiOf
The primary purpose for the formation of a professional
association or corporation is to obtain the tax benefits afforded
a corporation. The tax consequences of corporate status, how-
ever, are not always favorable to the professional.
The first obvious disadvantage of corporate status is the pos-
sible double taxation of the corporate income. The profits of the
corporation are taxed as income at the corporate level, 4 and also
59. 289 F. Supp. at 165.
60. 300 F. Supp. 1055 (D. Minn. 1969).
61. M xN. STAT. Extra Session 1961 § 319.02 subdivision 3.
62. 300 F. Supp. at 1060.
63. 7 CCH 1969 STAND. FED. TAX REP. P 6867A.
64. INTmNAL REvENuE CODE of 1954, § 11.
[Vol. 22
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NoTEs
at the shareholder level when dividends are paid.65 The double
tax can be avoided to some extent, however, by disbursing cor-
porate income to the shareholder-employees in the form of sal-
aries. The corporation is allowed a deduction for salaries paid
to its employees provided that the salaries "are reasonable." 60
The amount that is reasonable varies from association to associa-
tion. If the reasonableness of the salaries is ever questioned, the
taxpayer has the burden of proving that they are reasonable.
6 7
Salaries to the extent that they are unreasonable are dividends
and are not deductible.
The double taxation of the corporate income may also be
avoided by accumulating the income in the association's treasury.
This alternative is also beset with problems, however. If it is
determined under certain circumstances that the corporation is
accumulating earnings to avoid having them taxed as income to
the shareholders, a surtax is levied on these earnings in addition
to the regular corporate income tax.68
There is also a danger that a professional association or corp-
oration will be considered a personal holding company.69 The In-
ternal Revenue Code imposes a 70 per cent tax on all personal
holding company income. 70 One form of personal holding com-
pany income is that income derived from contracts which require
the corporation to furnish personal services. Such income is tax-
able under this provision if someone other than the corporation
could decide who will furnish the required services. 71 There is an
exception to this provision where the person performing the
services owns 25 per cent or more of the corporate shares. Thus,
if four professionals each own equal shares in the association, the
association need not worry about the personal holding company
tax."2
Another disadvantage is that the payments made by the em-
ployee and the association to the old-age, survivors and disability
65. Id.
66. Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 986 (1st Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 675 (1942); Baltimore Dairy Lunch v. United
States, 121 F. Supp. 357 (D. Minn. 1954), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on othcr
grounds, 231 F2d 870 (8th Cir. 1956).
67. Lewis Food Co. v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 611 (S.D. Cal. 1961);
Oppenheims Inc. v. Kavanagh, 90 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
68. I TmNAL PVNUE CoDE of 1954, § 531.
69. Id. § 543(a) (1). A personal holding company is an organization which
receives 60 per cent of its income in the form of personal holding company
income.
70. Id. § 543(a) (7).
71. Id.
72. Id. § 543 (a) (7) ; see Alexander, Some Tax Problems of a Professional
Association, 17 W. REs. L. Rzv. 212 (1962).
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insurance plan are nearly double the payments required of a
partner or sole practitioner. In addition, the professional em-
ployee is subjected to the federal unemployment tax.7 3 As a
result of obtaining corporate status the association is confronted
with adverse state tax consequence also.74 The double income
taxation aspect appears on the state tax level as well as on the
federal level.75 South Carolina also places a tax on each original
share of stock that is issued by the association.76 In South Caro-
lina a property tax is placed on all property owned by the associa-
tion and also on the share of the association owned by the pro-
fessional. 77 The same capital, therefore, is taxed twice.
All of the benefits derived from corporate tax status, how-
ever, are dependent on the classification of the members of the
professional association as employees of the association.7
As an employee, the professional is entitled to certain indirect
tax benefits. If disabled the professional may receive workman's
compensation benefits that are not included in his gross income.7 9
Under certain circumstances amounts received from the associa-
tion as reimbursement for medical expenses are not included in
the employee's gross income.80 In addition, any payments made
to the professional for the loss of a limb or bodily function or dis-
ability therefrom are not considered as part of his gross income.8"
Likewise, any payment made by the association under a wage con-
tinuation plan is not considered income to the professional if
certain conditions are met.8 2 At the professional's death his
family may receive up to $5,000 from the association without any
73. Id. §§ 3101(a)-3111(b).
74. The professional association act explicitly states that the laws regulating
domestic corporations will govern the professional associations unless such laws
are contrary to the provisions of the Professional Association Act; this includes
the tax laws. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1617 (Supp. 1968).
75. The association is subject to the South Carolina corporate income tax
and the professional as a shareholder is subject to the personal income tax on
dividends declared and received by the professional.
76. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 65-683-694 (1962).
77. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-1501 et seq. (1962).
78. INTERNAL REVENUE CoDE of 1954, § 3121(d) (1). Among other classifica-
tions of employees, the code defines employee as "any office of a corpora-
tion.. .. "
79. Id. § 104(a) (1).
80. Id. § 105(b). If the medical expenses had been considered a deduction
from the gross income in the employee's tax return, the reimbursement must be
included in the employee's gross income. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE of 1954,
§§ 105(b), 213.
81. Id. § 105(c).
82. Id. § 105(d). Self-employed persons are not subject-to this provision and
must include amounts received under a wage continuation plan in their gross
income. INTERN4AL REVENUE CODE of 1954, § 105(g).
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tax consequences.8" Income received in the form of stock options
is not taxable.
The biggest advantage of corporate status to the professional
is the tax benefit that he can receive as an employee by estab-
lishing pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans. All of the
litigation thus far on the issue of the tax status of professional
associations and corporations has involved these plans. The
amount contributed to the plans by the employer (the associa-
tion) is deductible from the employer's gross income8 4 if the plans
are "qualified.""5 The contributions are not considered income
to the employee (the professional) until he has actually received
his pension, profit-share, or stock."( The effect of the plan is to
deflect income from the employee to a trust until he reaches a
particular age or retires. When an employee's share is paid over
to him at retirement, he is normally in a lower tax bracket than
he was when his contributions were made.
To an extent it is possible under the alternative so-called
"CH.. 10" plans for the professional as a partner or sole practi-
tioner to establish a retirement plan with the advantages that are
available to corporate employees. Under the "H.R. 10" plan the
professional is designated as an "owner-employee." The "owner-
employee" is defined as one who "owns the entire interest in an
unincorporated trade or business [or] . . . is a partner who owns
more than 10 per cent of either the capital interest or the profits
interest in such partnerships."8 7 This concept is somewhat dif-
ferent from the concept of the "common-law employee," which
is the status of the professional once he begins performing serv-
ices for a professional association or corporation. The "R.R. 10"
plan is not as attractive to the professional as the plans available
to him as an employee of a professional association or cor-
poration.
'Whether a plan covers an "owner-employee" or simply an
employee, all of the plans must "qualify" under the code to reap
the tax benefits. The standards for qualifying an "H.R. 10" plan
are much stricter than the standards applicable to employee
plans. To qualify an "H.R. 10" plan the code specifies certain
requirements that must be met, but which are not requirements
83. Id. § 101(b) (2) (A).
84. Id. §§ 421-425. The professional's employer is not entitled to a deduction
from his gross income of the amount that is difference in the market price of
the stock and the amount paid under the option.
85. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE Of 1954, §§ 404(a) (1), (a) (3), (a) (5).
86. Id. § 402.
87. Id. § 401(3).
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for qualifying a plan covering only common law employees.
When a retirement plan covers one or more "owner-employees"
it is required that the trustee of the retirement fund be a bank.88
In addition, any contributions made to a plan on behalf of an
"owner-employee" or a common law employer covered by the
same plan are nonforfeitable.8 9 It is also necessary to include in
the plan" all persons who have been employed by the "owner-
employee" for three years and payments to an "owner-employee"
from the plan cannot be made until he reaches the age of fifty-
nine and one-half years of age.9' None of these specifications are
required to qualify a plan which merely covers common law
employees. In a retirement plan other than a "H.R. 10" plan, the
employer has a great deal more discretion as to who will be
covered by the plan and the rights of an employee are forfeit-
able. The "nonforfeitable" provision and the necessity of includ-
ing in the plan all employees with three years service are the
most unattractive features of an "H.R. 10" plan as far as "quali-
fying" the plan is concerned.
Another feature of the "M.R. 10" plan that make it unattrac-
tive is the limitation placed on the amount that can be con-
tributed to the plan in a single year on behalf of one "owner-
employee." The Code restricts the contribution to the amount
that can be deducted by the employer.92 In the case of a
professional who is a sole practitioner, he is considered to be his
own employer. If the professional is a partner of a firm, the
partnership is considered to be the employer of all the part-
ners.93 The employer in these cases is limited to a deduction of
$2,500 or 10 per cent of the earned income, "whichever is the
lesser." 94
Under a plan in which the professional is considered the com-
mon law employee of a professional association or corporation,
the amounts that may be contributed on his behalf are not so
restricted as under the "H.R. 10" plan. In fact, the amount of
contribution has no limitation, but there is a limitation on the
deduction that can be taken by the employer. Under a pension
plan, the employer's deduction is limited to "5 per cent of the
88. Id. § 401(d)(1).
89. Id § 401(d) (2).
90. Id.§ 401 (d)(3).
91. Id. § 401(d) 4(B).
92. Id. § 401(d) (5).
9.3 Id. § 401(c) (4).
94. Id. § 404(e) (1) (Supp. 1969).
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compensation otherwise paid or accrued during the taxable year
to all the employees under the trust . . .95 The deductions
available to an employer for contribution to a stock-bonus or
profit-sharing trust is limited to 15 per cent.96 There is also an
overall deduction limit of 25 per cent for contributions made by
the employer to the conglomerate of profit sharing, pension
annuity and stock bonus plans.97 However, if more than 25 per
cent is contributed in one year, the excess may be carried over
to subsequent years but the total deductions in subsequent years
cannot exceed 30 per cent of the compensation.9 The profes-
sional association or corporation, therefore, has a maximum
available deduction of 30 percent compared to the $2,500 maxi-
mum deduction available to an employer under an "H.R. 10,'
plan. But more importantly there is no limitation placed on the
amount of contribution, whereas under an "H.R. 10' plan the
contribution may not exceed 10 per cent of the earned income
or $2,500.
CONCLUSION
The struggle by the Internal Revenue Service in attempting
to prevent professional associations from obtaining corporate
status for tax purposes has thus far been most unsuccessful.
On August 8, 1969, the Internal Revenue Service conceded defeat
to an extent but not without qualification. Its statement that
"generally" the professional association will be given corporate
status except in "special circumstances" indicates that it obvi-
ously intends to continue to attack the corporate status of some
professional associations. The Internal Revenue Service may
argue that "Regulation H" is valid and applicable to all profes-
sional associations as opposed to professional corporations. In
light of the many decisions that have declared "Regulation H"
invalid as applied to professional corporations, the Internal
Revenue Service has, no doubt, at least conceded that "Regulation
H" is invalid insofar as these professional organizations are
concerned.
Although "Regulation H" may be invalid, no court, which has
confronted the question, has invalidated the original Kintner
regulations. These regulations are generally recognized to be
inapplicable to professional corporations, but in ascertaining the
95. Id. § 404(a) (1).
96. Id. § 404(a) (3).
97. Id. § 404(a) (7).
98. Id.
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tax status of an unincorporated professional association, they are
as applicable as are the Morissey criteria. All unincorporated
organizations must meet these regulations before they can be
classified as corporations for tax purposes.
The end of the struggle between the Internal Revenue Service
and the professional over corporate status may be drawing to
a close. At any rate, the professional has come a long way since
Morrissey and is the victor at the moment. Always lurking in
the background, however, is the prospect that Congress may be
persuaded by the Internal Revenue Service to change the statute.
Nothing is sacred in tax law.
H. W. McDomwALD, JR.
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